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The European Monetary Union (EMU) provides a new macro-level, institutional setting
for multinational enterprises (MNEs). The authors investigate the impact of regional
integration on MNE strategy by analysing Belgian firms’ entry-mode choices in foreign
markets, both EMUand non-EMUones, with a focus on what impact remains of country-
level risk. They demonstrate that regional integration has altered the impact of country-
level institutional risk on MNE entry-mode choices inside the EMU. The conventional
predictions of international business theory have been reversed, with higher country-level
risk inside the EMU driving a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries. Within the inte-
grated region, insider firms now view higher country-level risk as the equivalent of higher,
micro-level contracting risk. Such risk can best be mitigated through full internalization,
combined with arm’s length contracts, rather than through equity joint ventures.
Introduction
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks
have grown strongly throughout the past decades.
In parallel with this empirical phenomenon,
the scholarly literature has devoted substantial
attention to the determinants of multinational
enterprise (MNE) internationalization patterns.
This has included attention to the impacts of bilat-
eral investment treaties (BIT) (Oh and Fratianni,
2017) and regional integration (Kolk, Lindeque
and Buuse, 2014; Oh and Contractor, 2014; Oh
and Li, 2015; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2005;
Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016; Verbeke and Kano,
2016). Regional elements appear important, in
addition to country-level variables, to explain
various dimensions of MNE strategy (Arre`gle
et al., 2013; Blevins et al., 2016; Kim and Aguilera,
2015; Oh and Rugman, 2012; Rugman and Oh,
2013). Regions should therefore be considered
systematically when MNE international ex-
pansion patterns are investigated. The present
study focuses on the impact of a particularly
far-reaching case of regional integration, namely
that of the European Monetary Union (EMU),
on insider MNEs’ entry-mode choices.
Regional integration arrangements such as the
EMU – with the euro as its common currency and
with a commonmonetary policy – aim to facilitate
the free ﬂow of goods, services, capital and labour,
and are supposedly instrumental in establishing
more efficient markets. Firms from one EMU
member can expect to enjoy free(er) economic
access to all other member states and to the
various beneﬁts from this far-reaching European
integration. Such beneﬁts result from the common
European framework driving an institutional-
level playing ﬁeld, in this case including monetary
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policy (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004). However,
little is known about whether – and how – insider
MNEs consider regional integration in their entry-
mode choices, an issue we address in this study.
A large number of prior entry-mode studies have
usefully focused on transaction cost economics
(TCE) and related internalization theory-based
explanations to explain MNE entries. Here,
ﬁrm-level parameters in the ‘contracting sphere’
(broadly considered) are the most critical in pro-
viding guidance to entry-mode selection. However,
it has also been argued that micro-level analyses
‘must be qualiﬁed by factors stemming from the
institutional and cultural context’ (Kogut and
Singh, 1988, p. 412; North, 1990). Here, several
studies have focused on the potentially important
impact of foreign legal and regulatory frameworks
on MNE decision-making (Coeurderoy and
Murray, 2008; Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu,
2007; Holmes et al., 2013).1 The bulk of past
empirical work has focused on host-country-
level characteristics, which raises the question
of whether the impact of these country-level
variables would remain ‘as expected’ in an era
of increased regional integration (Verbeke and
Asmussen, 2016).
In the present paper, we assess howMNEs from
one speciﬁc economy might adapt their entry-
mode strategies as a function of regional integra-
tion, in this case exempliﬁed by the presence of a
‘Single Market’ and the sharing of a common cur-
rency. Regional integration, by deﬁnition, entails
a change in a set of macro-level, institutional shift
parameters and the related requirements for re-
source bundling by MNEs (Rugman and Verbeke,
2004). Our study thereby extends the literature on
the implications of regional integration for inter-
national business (Banalieva, Jiang and Santoro,
2010; Benito, Grøgaard and Narula, 2003; Rug-
man and Oh, 2013; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).
Several prior studies did analyse the effect of
European integration on a variety of entry-related
phenomena within Europe, such as cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (Moschieri, Ragozzino
and Campa, 2014), and the number of research
1The institutional environment can be decomposed into
formal and informal institutions, with the latter some-
times including ‘culture’ (Holmes et al., 2013). In our pa-
per, however, we adopt the conventional distinction made
between the impact of institutions, referring to formal in-
stitutions only, and the impact of culture.
and development (R&D) partnerships being
established (Ramsay, Kay and Hennart, 2001).
However, these studies did not investigate formally
the differential impact on entry-mode choices trig-
gered by regional integration, when expanding
within vs. outside the region.
In contrast, the present article offers novel
insight into the impact of operating within the
EMU core vs. operating outside the EMU. We
do consider traditional explanatory variables for
entry-mode strategies from TCE/internalization
theory, and from studies on institutional context
and cultural distance, but we combine these
with variables measuring the impact of regional
integration between the home and host countries.
Speciﬁcally, we test the effects of conventional,
national institutional risk and cultural distance
on entry-mode strategies for expansion within vs.
outside the home region.
The next section highlights the most commonly
studied variables affecting entry-mode strategies.
In the third and fourth sections, we develop
our hypotheses and describe the methodology.
The ﬁfth section discusses our results, as well as
the research and management implications, the
limitations and future research directions. The
ﬁnal section concludes.
Theoretical background
Conventional internalization theory suggests that
the interplay between ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages
(FSAs) and country-speciﬁc advantages (CSAs)
will determine MNE location and entry-mode
choices (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Firm-
speciﬁc advantages represent the MNE’s unique
resource combinations that allow the additional
costs of doing business abroad vis-a`-vis relevant
rivals operating in host environments to be over-
come. Firm-speciﬁc advantages can include as-
sets protected by property rights (such as patented
knowledge), but also managerial capabilities al-
lowing efficient resource orchestration.
Country-speciﬁc advantages determine location
choices. Here, performing particular value-added
activities in particular host countries allows im-
perfect markets to be overcome and may thus re-
duce the MNE’s spatial transaction costs com-
pared with operating out of the home market
only (Rugman, 1990). Most importantly, locating
value-added activities abroad can be instrumental
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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for comparatively more efficient ‘asset bundling’
(Hennart, 2009; Verbeke and Hillemann, 2013).
Given the MNE’s extant reservoir of FSA and its
selection of locations with particular CSAs, the
choice to set up a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS,
full internalization) vis-a`-vis an equity joint ven-
ture (EJV), in any particular host country reﬂects
the relative beneﬁts associated with these alterna-
tive entry strategies (Buckley and Casson, 1976;
Teece, 1986). Rugman and Verbeke (1992) describe
how MNEs internalize speciﬁc operations be-
cause of natural and government-induced market
imperfections.
In addition to evaluating transaction costs aris-
ing directly from speciﬁc business dealings with
particular economic actors at the micro level,
MNEs also consider each host country’s broader
institutional environment (Demirbag,Glaister and
Tatoglu, 2007; Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri,
2016). Here, formal institutions represent the un-
derlying structure within which business operates,
and they deﬁne the prevailing regulatory setting
in the host country (Davis, Desai and Francis,
2000; Holmes et al., 2013; North, 1990). Transac-
tion cost economics theory suggests that macro-
level institutional structures represent a frame
within which theMNE’s operations are conducted
(North, 1990;Williamson, 1985). The extreme case
of macro-level framing is one whereby the ‘opti-
mal’ micro-level choice is simply made impossi-
ble: for example, when a host government restricts
foreign ownership levels (Gomes-Casseres, 1990;
North, 1990). Multinational enterprises are then
‘incentivized’ to select a lower ownership level,
as found in an EJV, with low(er) control modes
not only meeting public policy preferences, but
also increasing the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility (Anderson and
Gatignon, 1986).
In the case of high, host-country institutional
risk, the complementary resources provided by a
local partner, and which cannot be accessed in ef-
ﬁcient, external markets, can supposedly mitigate
this macro-level risk (Anderson and Gatignon,
1986; Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu, 2007). Sev-
eral scholars have found support for this link in
their empirical studies, in particular the negative
relationship between political or economic risk
and the ownership level in the host-country oper-
ation (Kim and Hwang, 1992; Shan, 1991).2
2However, Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri (2016) de-
scribe an alternative scenario, whereby a foreign ﬁrm
Foreign MNEs also face broader institutional
hazards that can affect entry-mode strategies. For
example, the institutional environment may suffer
from weaknesses causing increased business risk
for all ﬁrms, such as insufficient property rights
protection (North and Weingast, 1989). In host
countries with weaker property rights, MNEs tend
to invest less because of greater transactional risk
and less predictable proﬁts (Williamson, 1996).
Property rights protection is especially critical for
MNEs with an intrinsic preference for equity own-
ership, because of the nature of their FSAs. Such
cases typically arise when the resource bundles be-
ing transferred to host countries cannot be trans-
acted in efficient markets, thereby making market
contracting (e.g. licensing) problematic. In the case
of high institutional hazards, such as those result-
ing from weak property rights protection, there
will be a stronger preference to select an EJV, as-
suming the local partner can provide resources
such as strong relationships with the local regula-
tory enforcement apparatus, that cannot be trans-
acted either in efficient markets (Hennart, 2009).
Adding macro-level institutional characteristics
as parameters in empirical work thus helps to
explain the MNE’s differential capacity to de-
ploy, exploit and augment its FSAs across national
institutional contexts for each entry mode. The op-
timal entry-mode strategy will depend on both the
desired level of FSA protection (and further FSA
enhancement) in the micro-level transactions at
hand, and the anticipated exposure to macro-level
hazards in the host country’s institutional environ-
ment likely to spill over to micro-level contracting
behaviour (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).
Mainstream, internalization theory thinking
would thereby suggest that higher national in-
stitutional risk in the host country will increase
MNE preferences for EJVs compared with WOSs.
This prediction is subject to the qualiﬁcation that
may be better protected against expropriation in a low-
institutional-quality environment than the host-country
partner. In that case, and in the absence of foreign
ownership limits, the host-country partner(s) might actu-
ally have a preference for foreign MNE majority owner-
ship to protect against outright expropriation. We think
this is an unlikely scenario, but it might have validity in
circumstances where the foreign MNE does not bring
high levels of proprietary knowledge to the partnership.
Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri (2014) also suggest
that, in instances of high institutional risk, host-country
partners may increase their minority equity share because
such higher share can alleviate agency problems.
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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the complementary resources provided by a lo-
cal partner can mitigate macro-level hazards in
the form of institutional risks, and do not trig-
ger new and signiﬁcant micro-level risks. This
prediction is valid across strategic entry motiva-
tions, whether market-seeking, resource-seeking,
efficiency-seeking and even strategic asset-seeking.
In each case, the exact form that will be taken by
institutional risk may be different but, across the
board, successful entry can best be supported by a
local partner who knows how to navigate the risky
institutional setting at hand, and who is enlisted
to safeguard any knowledge transferred from the
MNE home country to local operations.
The broader empirical literature in interna-
tional business has also consistently demonstrated
the impact of higher institutional risk (e.g. in
the realm of legal enforceability of agreements)
on MNE strategic decision-making (Bucheli and
Kim, 2015). For example, Berry (2017) has shown
the impact of weak intellectual property rights pro-
tection regimes on the internal knowledge protec-
tion strategies of US MNEs.
Hypotheses development
Regional integration and institutional risk
Most national governments, including European
ones, typically strive to achieve non-discrimination
of their home-grown ﬁrms when these oper-
ate abroad (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2008).
They typically attempt to establish closer relation-
ships with strategically important neighbouring
countries, and this can take the form of regional in-
tegration. The level of regional integration is prob-
ably the most advanced in Europe, and this has
been achieved through the European Union (EU)
and the EMU. The EMU probably represents the
highest level of regional integration presently ob-
servable in the world economy. Besides a single
market, the 19 EMU member states share a single
monetary policy that is enriched by the Stability
and Growth Pact, i.e. a framework for national ﬁs-
cal policies in the EU. Hence, the EMU is broader
in scope in terms of the number of member states
involved and their depth, i.e. the range of policy ar-
eas dealt with, than any other regional integration
treaty.
With the introduction of a single European cur-
rency, the EMU reduced exchange rate instability
and uncertainty. More speciﬁcally, de Sousa and
Lochard (2011, p. 554) describe how the EMU
has had an impact on FDI through a reduction
in transaction costs, since it: ‘(1) removes currency
conversion costs; (2) suppresses in-house costs of
maintaining separate foreign currency expertise;
(3) eases price decisions and comparison of in-
ternational costs; (4) irrevocably removes intra-
eurozone exchange-rate volatility’. In broader eco-
nomic terms, the EMU has also affected growth,
openness, labour markets, productivity and prices
(Baldwin et al. 2008). It has positively affected the
efficiency of capital markets and all other markets
for inputs, intermediate outputs and ﬁnal outputs.
Even more broadly, when signing regional inte-
gration agreements, member states typically expect
to beneﬁt in political and economic terms (Lamy,
2002). First, by harmonizing the economic struc-
ture of member states, regional integration facili-
tates control of – and coordination with – micro-
level economic actors in international transactions
(Benito, Grøgaard and Narula, 2003). Second, the
more highly integrated input and output markets
facilitate – and reduce costs associated with – re-
cruiting, training, deploying and monitoring of
employees in foreign operations. Third, increased
regional integration typically confers the insider
MNE with higher legitimacy and ease of working
with a wide range of external, local stakeholders,
compared with regional outsider MNEs.
All the above point to requisite inputs and com-
plementary resources becoming more readily ac-
cessible in efficiently functioning external markets,
and institutional hazards in the form of ex ante
equity level restrictions and ex post expropria-
tion risks declining or being eliminated through-
out the region. The infusion into the MNE’s
decision-making context of a new level of reliable,
high-quality regional institutions substituting for
national-level (either discriminatory, or otherwise
less efficient) ones allows the ﬁrm to focus more
on managing micro-level risks rather than on safe-
guarding against national-level risks. Any remain-
ing, national-level institutional risks within the re-
gion can now be more easily managed by the ﬁrm
itself, possibly with the support of local, external
contracting parties, and without the need to take
on boardEJVpartners, whose presencewould trig-
ger the need for additional, micro-level safeguards
to protect the MNE’s FSAs.
The above allows qualiﬁcation of the internal-
ization theory prediction that greater institutional
risk at the macro level in a host country will
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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typically have a positive effect on the MNE’s like-
lihood to operate an EJV vis-a`-vis a WOS at the
micro level. We expect this effect not only to be
moderated, but actually to be reversed for MNEs
expanding to countries that are part of their home
country’s regional integration agreements, in this
case the EMU. When operating in a regionally in-
tegrated market, ‘insider’ MNEs will tend to view
higher national institutional risk as a parameter
that can and should be managed by the ﬁrm it-
self, similar to micro-risks that require more rather
than less control over how to manage the com-
pany’s FSAs. The national institutions triggering
‘residual’ risk inside the integrated region do so
largely by ‘cascading down’ frailties to the micro-
level, e.g. increasing the danger of FSA dissipation
in cases of equity-based contracting modes with
partners, and are treated as if they were micro-level
sources of risk. These should be managed directly
by the ﬁrm through higher internalization, possi-
bly in combination with market contracts (e.g. for
specialized legal services): a lower use of EJVs will
ensue.
In the EMU (given the absence in almost all sec-
tors of institutional limits imposed on ownership
levels and dangers of expropriation), the key insti-
tutional problem facing the MNE when tapping
into complementary resources provided by local
partners is its vulnerability to unwanted knowl-
edge dissipation at the micro level. What matters
here are the intricate details of the national-level
knowledge appropriability regime in a broad sense,
such as the non-discrimination of foreign ﬁrms in
courts of law and the presence of robust institu-
tional checks and balances, without which the risk
of unintended knowledge dissipation without full
recourse would prevail. Micro-level equity part-
ners could then build on macro-level frailties of
the host country to take advantage of the MNE.
Use of an EJV partner would create new, ‘inside’,
micro-level institutional hazards.
The EJV partner de facto gains much easier,
privileged access to coveted MNE FSAs than any
external actor. In the EMU, stronger macro-level
frailties at the national level with the danger of
spilling over to micro-level contracting will in-
crease the predicted level of MNE ownership. In
these cases, EJV partners who are not needed to
accommodate foreign equity-level restrictions or
to mitigate risks of expropriation could engage in
contract infringement and free-riding that can be
avoided through internalization.
In contrast, lower national-level institutional
hazards associated with entry into a particular
EMU country will reduce the micro-level hazards
of unwanted knowledge dissipation and thus, ce-
teris paribus, will support setting up EJVs with
local actors. In EMU host countries with lower
national-level, institutional risk, MNEs will be
able to rely more extensively on macro-level safe-
guards when engaging in knowledge-sharing and
in new resource-recombining with EJV partners,
thus also strengthening the opportunity to develop
new FSAs to be exploited in the host country and
beyond (Verbeke, 2013). Here, lower national-level
institutional risk also reducesmicro-level contract-
ing hazards.
Thus when internationalizing within regional
markets such as the EMU, where limits on equity
ownerships levels are absent and the risks of expro-
priation very low, and a common regional, regula-
tory regime of high quality prevails, the MNE will
try to avoid complicating the entry process in coun-
tries with higher institutional risk by internalizing
(e.g. through hiring employees responsible, inter
alia, for the political risk mitigation function) and
by contracting for specialized services. Here, an
EJV partner would require additional safeguards
to avoid intra-EJV FSA dissipation problems. We
thus hypothesize:
H1: Home–regional integration will reverse the
conventional positive effect of higher, national
institutional risk onMNE preferences for EJVs,
whereas this effect will remain positive outside
the region.
Regional integration and cultural distance
Cultural distance, which could be interpreted
as the lack of alignment between informal in-
stitutions between two countries, has been the
most frequently studied macro-level variable to
explain entry-mode choices at the micro level
(Morschett, Schramm-Klein and Swoboda, 2010).
However, the prior literature has not led to
any consensus on predicted effects (Beugelsdijk
et al., 2018; Morschett, Schramm-Klein and Swo-
boda, 2010; Shenkar, 2001; Tihanyi, Griffith and
Russell, 2005). Meta-analyses by Beugelsdijk et al.
(2018), Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005) and
Morschett, Schramm-Klein and Swoboda (2010)
have shown a non-signiﬁcant relationship between
cultural distance and entry-mode decisions, but we
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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introduce this parameter as a main, independent
variable, in the context of regional integration,
so as to allow comparability with prior studies
(Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst and Lange, 2014;
Lee, Shenkar and Li, 2008).
The dominant view is that a reduction in
cultural-context similarity should be interpreted
as the equivalent of an increase in macro-level
investment risks affecting host market attractive-
ness (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Dunning,
1993). Ceteris paribus, MNEs supposedly prefer
economies with a similar cultural context and then
tend to select wholly owned entry modes in such
contexts in order to realize the full proﬁt potential
of their FSAs (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kim and
Hwang, 1992).
Following this perspective,MNEs would – when
expanding into host countries with higher cultural
distance and therefore higher perceived risks – tend
to prefer, again ceteris paribus, EJVs, and this for
two reasons. First, this entry-mode limits the ex-
posure to such risks by lowering commitments of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources (Erramilli and Rao, 1993;
Kim and Hwang, 1992). Second, an EJV with a
host-country partner allows access to local com-
plementary resources that reduce cultural distance
with external actors when these resources can-
not be accessed in external markets (Beamish and
Banks, 1987; Rugman, 1985). Here, the local EJV
partner acts as a bridge between the MNE and the
high cultural-distance, external environment.3
In terms of extant empirical research, much
work indeed suggests that cultural distance makes
shared-control modes comparatively more attrac-
tive (Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Kogut and
Singh, 1988), but this result does not appear to
hold strongly. Given that cultural-distance effects
have been assessed in most extant studies that have
analysedMNE entry-mode choices, and have used
3Two qualiﬁcations should be added here. First, some
scholars have argued that, in one particular case, a pos-
itive relationship between the level of sociocultural dis-
tance and the level of ownership may hold, namely ‘when
there is a substantial advantage to doing business in the
entrant’s way’ (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986, p. 18).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, cultural distance
does not necessarily translate into objectively higher haz-
ards for the MNE in terms of behavioural dysfunction
in micro-level contracting: higher cultural distance at
the macro level does not need to spill over to more ex-
pected dishonesty or broader unreliability in micro-level
contracting.
macro-level variables (Malhotra, Sivakumar and
Zhu, 2011), we do the same in the present study,
but focusing on the context of regional integration
(for recent reviews on the importance of culture
in international business studies, see (Harzing and
Pudelko, 2016) and (Stahl and Tung, 2014)).
Cultural distance between regionally integrated
countries, though not affected directly by regional
integration and thus still present owing to hetero-
geneous cultures within the region (Blevins et al.,
2016), could also become interpreted as a source
of micro-level risks, especially in the context of
joint ventures, that can be mitigated through use
of WOSs, somewhat analogous to the case of in-
stitutional risk. The argument is that, within the
integrated region, the insiderMNEwill have much
more ample scope to select, train, deploy andmon-
itor the employees who can provide the best dual
ﬁt with the ﬁrm’s culture and the host-country
national culture. When expanding into a higher
cultural distance country within the region, the
best way to overcome such distance is therefore
by hiring contracting parties as employees. Here
again, EJVs are viewed as bringing unnecessary
complexity to foreign operations, with macro-level
cultural distance challenges potentially cascading
down to the micro level, whereas use of WOSs
within the region allows socialization of employ-
ees, and strengthening – where efficient – of the
importance of corporate culture over national cul-
ture. This leads to the following hypothesis in the
realm of entry within the home region:
H2: Home–regional integration will reverse
the conventional positive effect of higher cul-
tural distance on MNE preferences for EJVs,
whereas this effect will remain positive outside
the region.
Method
Data and sample
The Belﬁrst database published by Bureau van
Dijk provided an initial selection of 121 publicly
listed Belgian companies with international sub-
sidiaries. We triangulated this database with ﬁ-
nancial and other information provided in each
of the MNE’s annual reports, and through direct
correspondence with individual companies. Over
the period covering 1999–2014, we identiﬁed a to-
tal of 1368 foreign entry events from 46 listed
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Belgian, non-ﬁnancial MNEs.4 We collected data
on entry decisions after 1999 because the Eurozone
was introduced on 1 January 1999. Our sample of
46 MNEs represents over 70% of the total mar-
ket capitalization of all listed Belgian non-ﬁnancial
MNEs with international subsidiaries at the time
of data collection.
Measurement of variables
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in our
study is the MNE’s entry-mode strategy for each
subsidiary. As a binomial dummy, it takes the value
of 1 for an observed WOS (full ownership) and 0
for an EJV (shared ownership). We used the con-
ventional 95% cut-off point for deﬁning a WOS,
following previous studies (Gomes-Casseres, 1990;
Hennart, 1991; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Yui
and Makino, 2002). Ownership shares under 5%
were excluded, as we considered those to be port-
folio investments rather than direct investments.
Independent variables. Institutional risk and cul-
tural differences are examined in our study as the
independent variables. To capture the varying lev-
els of institutional risk characterizing host coun-
tries, we applied the widely used Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2010). TheWGI are based on 31 under-
lying data sources and include data on 215 coun-
tries over the period between 1996 and 2014, cov-
ering six broad dimensions of governance, namely:
(1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability
and absence of violence; (3) government effective-
ness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6)
control of corruption. Each dimension ismeasured
on a scale between −2.5 and 2.5, with higher val-
ues indicating lower institutional risk. Given the
fact that correlations between the six dimensions
surpassed 0.5, we followed prior studies (Dikova
and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Slangen and Van
Tulder, 2009) and averaged the scores of the six di-
mensions into a composite index measuring gover-
nance quality in a host country for a given year.We
then converted a negative (positive) value to a pos-
4We excluded two large MNEs with available data from
the list, because these ﬁrms cannot be considered as
‘Belgian’ in the conventional sense: ﬁrst, Anheuser-Busch
InBev is a Belgian-Brazilian MNE with headquarters in
Leuven, Belgium and Sao Paulo, Brazil; second, the con-
trolling shareholder of Telenet is LibertyGlobal Inc., Col-
orado, USA.
itive (negative) value by multiplying by the ‘nega-
tive one’, for ease of interpretation. Thus, a higher
value indicates higher institutional risk. For the
years 1999 and 2001, we considered the dimension
scores of the preceding year (i.e. 1998 and 2000)
since data for these years were not available, fol-
lowing extant studies (Dikova and Van Witteloos-
tuijn, 2007; Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009).
In contrast to most prior empirical work, we did
not use the traditional Kogut and Singh (1988) in-
dex to measure cultural distance. We agree with
Shenkar (2001) and Tung and Verbeke (2010) that
this index merely creates a false ‘illusion of equiv-
alence’, because it assumes the equal importance
of differences in the scores on Hofstede’s (1980)
various national cultural dimensions between the
host country and theMNE’s home country, in this
case Belgium. To overcome the shortcomings of
the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, we measured
cultural distance as the Euclidean distance index,
based on the traditional four dimensions of Hof-
stede (1980): power distance; individualism; mas-
culinity; and uncertainty avoidance.
Interaction variable. We argued above that the
effects of institutional risk and cultural distance on
entry mode depend on home–regional integration.
Thus, regional integration (EMU) is coded as 1 if
the subsidiary is located inside an EMU country, 0
otherwise.We used the EMU as a regional integra-
tion variable because it has a single, unambiguous
introduction date for the participating nations
(i.e. 1 January 1999), in contrast to the formation
of the EU. This single date also makes the dis-
tinction between FDI in an ‘intra-EMU’ country
vs. an ‘outside-EMU’ country unambiguous. In
addition, the EMU is the highest-level form of
economic and institutional integration presently
observable. We conducted supplemental analyses,
using the EU as an alternative variable for measur-
ing regional integration and found similar results.
Control variables. We included a number of con-
trol variables that could inﬂuence the entry-mode
decision: geographic distance; ﬁrm size; R&D in-
tensity; marketing intensity; international business
experience; host-country experience; and family
ﬁrm status.
Geographic distance increases entry barriers
through the costs of transportation, managerial
control and communication links (e.g. Berthelon
andFreund, 2008; Buckley andCasson, 1976). Ge-
ographic distance was measured ‘as the crow ﬂies’,
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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using the physical distance in kilometres between
the capital of the home country considered, in this
case Belgium, and the capital of the host country.
Because it was positively skewed, the variable was
transformed logarithmically.
Several scholars (Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992; Erramilli and Rao, 1993) have argued that
larger ﬁrm size increases the likelihood of WOSs,
since full control modes require more ﬁnancial
and managerial resources compared with EJVs.
However, others (Hennart and Larimo, 1998;
Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008) have suggested
that large MNEs may face increasing difficulties,
adding to their already diversiﬁed portfolio with
additional WOSs. We measured MNE size as the
parent’s global assets in millions of euros and
transformed the variable logarithmically because
of its skewed distribution.
Following Yui and Makino’s (2002) approach
to take into account expected transaction costs
associated with various entry modes, we capture
the strength of the parent’s FSAs. We deﬁned
upstream ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge as the par-
ent’s R&D intensity and calculated the R&D
expenditures as a proportion of total annual sales
(Banalieva and Dhanaraj, 2013). We calculated
the parent’s ‘marketing efforts’ (marketing advan-
tages) in terms of overall sales, general and admin-
istrative (SG&A) expenses as a proportion of total
annual sales (Banalieva and Dhanaraj, 2013).
Multinational enterprises with prior experience
are expected to have gained skills on how to
overcome obstacles in host countries (Agarwal
and Ramaswami, 1992; Erramilli, 1991). We mea-
sured general international business experience
(experience – international) as the number of years
since the establishment of the ﬁrst international
subsidiary (Erramilli, 1991). Country-speciﬁc
experience (experience – country) is deﬁned as
the number of years since the establishment of
the ﬁrst subsidiary in a speciﬁc host country (Li
and Meyer, 2009). Both experience variables are
measured in logarithmic terms, as the ‘quantity’
of experience would add decreasing marginal
value to the parent’s overall stock of experience
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999).
Previous studies (e.g. Gallo and Sveen, 1991;
Pukall and Calabro`, 2014) have argued that the
internationalization processes of family ﬁrms dif-
fer from their non-family counterparts. We con-
trolled for the family effect by creating a dummy
variable family ﬁrm, coded as 1 if the MNE is a
family ﬁrm, 0 otherwise. Following previous stud-
ies (e.g. Gallo and Sveen, 1991), we deﬁned fam-
ily ﬁrms as one where a family member serves as
senior executive or director with an equity owner-
ship stake. All the independent and control vari-
ables were grand-mean centred, as suggested by
Hofmann and Gavin (1998).
Statistical analysis
Since our entry-mode choice data have a hierar-
chical structure, we used a multilevel mixed-effects
logistic regression analysis, using the melogit
command in STATA. Here, a conventional binary
logistic regression approach was not appropriate,
because our sample violates the assumptions
of constant error variance and independence of
errors. Since a single parent ﬁrm can have multiple
EJVs or WOSs, entry-mode decisions are not
independent of each other and the observed oper-
ations may share common attributes due to their
belonging to the same parent ﬁrm (Arre`gle, He´bert
and Beamish, 2006; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2011).
In our study, the entry-mode data are nested with
the parent ﬁrm level; the subsidiary’s entry-mode
variables (e.g.WOSs vs. EJVs) are level-1 variables,
and parent ﬁrm-level variables (e.g. ﬁrm size) are
level-2 variables.
In order to examine the degree of within-group
homogeneity (i.e. how each foreign affiliate is sim-
ilar in each MNE), we examined the ICC (intra-
class correlation), which measures the proportion
of variance explained by the MNE headquarters.
The ICC based on the full model was 0.41, sug-
gesting that approximately 41% of the variance
of entry-mode choice is explained by between-
MNEs variability. The multilevel, mixed-effects lo-
gistic regression analysis is therefore appropriate
for our analysis. Furthermore, our sample consists
of MNEs only, i.e. ﬁrms with international sub-
sidiaries using WOSs and/or EJVs modes. Domes-
tic ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms without any international op-
erations, and internationally operating companies
with other operating modes (e.g. exports, licens-
ing) were excluded. In order to correct for this bias
from non-random sampling, we adopted a two-
stage Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979).
As a ﬁrst step,5 we used all Belgian listed ﬁrms, ex-
cept ﬁrms active in ﬁnancial industries, to estimate
5The ﬁrst stage probit model took the following form:
Probability (MNEs have either a WOS or EJV) = α + β1
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: means, standard deviations and correlations
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Entry mode 0.77 0.42
2. Geographic distance 7.02 1.45 −0.08
3. Firm size 14.23 2.01 −0.10 0.26
4. Marketing advantages 0.19 0.17 0.01 −0.03 −0.05
5. R&D intensity 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.03 −0.01 0.58
6. Experience – international 60.40 49.39 −0.09 0.34 0.83 −0.04 0.02
7. Experience – country 21.35 30.31 0.00 −0.11 0.51 0.00 0.02 0.59
8. Family ﬁrm 0.51 0.50 −0.03 −0.06 −0.14 −0.32 −0.19 0.01 0.05
9. Institutional risk −1.29 0.83 −0.16 0.55 0.14 −0.10 −0.04 0.20 −0.15 0.03
10. Cultural distance 2.26 0.97 −0.03 0.35 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.17 −0.09 −0.03 0.05
11. Regional integration (EMU) 0.47 0.50 0.04 −0.69 −0.15 0.03 −0.08 −0.21 0.15 0.10 −0.41 −0.47
12. Inverse Mills Ratio 0.56 0.19 0.07 −0.04 −0.16 0.18 0.23 −0.12 −0.06 −0.07 −0.04 −0.03 0.07
Correlations greater than │0.06 │are signiﬁcant at p  0.05 and those greater than │0.09│are signiﬁcant at p  0.01. Two-tailed
coefficient test (N = 1,368).
the probability that a ﬁrm has a WOS or an EJV
operating mode, which generated an Inverse Mills
Ratio. The Inverse Mills Ratio was included as an
additional control variable in the second stage of
our mixed-effects logistic regression. The inclusion
of the Inverse Mills Ratio in the statistical analysis
controls for sample selection bias thatmight be due
to non-random sampling (Heckman, 1979).
In addition, in order to test for the existence of
multicollinearity, we examined the variance inﬂa-
tion factor (VIF), including the interaction terms,
after all variables were grand-mean centred. The
mean of the VIFs is 2.45, with a range vary-
ing from 1.11 to 4.45, suggesting that the VIF of
each variable is below the conventional threshold
(VIF>10), and thus our data do not raise multi-
collinearity concerns (Myers, 1990; Neter, Kutner
and Wassermand, 1990).
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. In our
sample, 319 (23.3%) affiliates are EJVs, and 1049
(76.7%) affiliates areWOSs. The 46 BelgianMNEs
had entries in 66 different countries.6
Table 2 shows the results of our hypotheses test-
ing to predict the likelihood of WOSs. Model 1
(ﬁrm age) + β2 (industry dummies) + β3 (region dum-
mies in Belgium) + ɛ. The ﬁrst-stage model is statistically
signiﬁcant (χ 2 = 22.13, p < 0.05)
6More speciﬁcally, 505 WOSs and 139 EJVs were located
in EMU countries, 167 WOSs and 29 EJVs in other EU
countries (non-EMU), and 377 WOSs and 151 EJVs in
host countries outside the EU.
includes only control variables, andModel 2 shows
the main effects of institutional risk and cultural
distance. Models 3 and 4 examine the interaction
effects of regional integration, and Model 5 is the
fully speciﬁed model.
The conventional international business litera-
ture suggested that higher levels of institutional
risk and (albeit more controversial) cultural dis-
tance would decrease MNE preferences for WOSs.
InModel 2, both institutional risk and cultural dis-
tance are indeed negatively associated with WOSs,
even though the effect of cultural distance is statis-
tically signiﬁcant only at p = 0.10 level.
In our Hypothesis 1, we suggested an interactive
effect of national institutional risk and regional in-
tegration on entry modes. The results from Model
3 support this hypothesis (β = 1.06, p< 0.01), indi-
cating that MNEs prefer WOSs (over EJVs) when
there is a high level of national, institutional risk
for their subsidiaries located in EMU countries.
However, the conventional argument from the in-
ternational business literature is conﬁrmed for sub-
sidiaries in non-EMU countries such that higher
levels of institutional risk would increase MNE
preferences for EJVs.7
We also predicted an interactive effect of re-
gional integration on the relationship between
7Marginal effects of institutional change are dy/dx =
0.073 (p0.10) for foreign affiliates inside the EMU, and
dy/dx = −0.053 (p0.001) for foreign affiliates outside
the EMU. The contrasts of average marginal effects are
also statistically signiﬁcant (Chi-square = 6.53, p 0.01),
suggesting that there is a signiﬁcant difference in terms
of entry-mode choices between entering inside vs. outside
the EMU.
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Figure 1. Relationship between institutional risks and probability of wholly owned subsidiary [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlineli-
brary.com]
cultural distance and entry-mode choice in Hy-
pothesis 2, in the sense that the expected im-
pact of higher cultural distance on the prefer-
ence for EJVs would be reversed within the EMU.
However, the predicted interactive effect of cul-
tural distance and regional integration on the ob-
served entry mode was not statistically signiﬁcant
inModel 4 orModel 5. Thus,Hypothesis 2 was not
supported.
To visualize the interaction effect for interna-
tional operations established in the post-EMU pe-
riod, we plotted the effects of institutional risk
on entry-mode strategies at different conditions
of regional integration. Figure 1 indicates that
MNEs show different decision patterns, depend-
ing on whether operations are located in the
EMU (i.e. a ‘disordinal’ interaction pattern). For
entry decisions in EMU countries, MNEs pre-
fer WOSs as national institutional risk increases.
In contrast, for operations in non-EMU coun-
tries, MNEs follow the more conventional logic,
and prefer EJVs as the level of institutional risk
increases.
Supplemental analyses
We conducted a number of supplemental analy-
ses to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings. Given
that the distinction made between an EJV vs. a
WOS has not always been clear-cut in the past, we
also adopted 90% and 100% (instead of 95%) eq-
uity cutoff rates. We also used the percentage of
ownership level as a dependent variable. These re-
sults were consistent with the initial outcomes, but
with slightly different levels of signiﬁcance. In ad-
dition, we used the EU instead of the EMU as a
variable for regional integration. The EU and the
EMU are highly correlated (r = 0.75, p < 0.001)
and the results are similar to the reported ones. We
also included industry (i.e. NACE-BEL industry
classiﬁcation) and year dummy variables to con-
trol for the industry effects and time effects. Our
results are similar when industry and year dummy
variables are included. Lastly, while the euro was
introduced as ‘book money’ in January 1999, the
actual physical notes and coins were distributed
as of January 2002. Therefore, we examined the
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
12 J. Hillemann, A. Verbeke and W.-Y. Oh
sample period covering only the years 2002–2014
(N = 1,143), when the euro notes and coins were
physically used. The results are similar to Table 2.
We assessed whether the effect of regional integra-
tion might simply result from geographic proxim-
ity. Thus, we conducted additional analyses using
geographic distance as an interaction variable. We
did not ﬁnd any interaction effects of geographic
distance on the entry-mode choice, suggesting that
what matters to the MNE’s entry-mode decision is
actually the institutional features of regional inte-
gration, not just geographic proximity.
Finally, we conducted a subgroup analysis, and
the results conﬁrm our ﬁndings. For entry deci-
sions in EMU countries (N = 644), MNEs prefer
WOSs as national institutional risk increases (β
= 0.67, p < 0.05). However, for entry decisions
outside EMU countries (N = 724), MNEs are less
likely to use WOSs as institutional risk increases
(β = −0.50, p < 0.001).
Discussion
This study focuses on the effects of regional
integration (EMU), institutional risk and cultural
distance onMNE entry-mode strategies. Our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that regional integration is a critical
factor in internationalization decisions. We also
do provide support for mainstream international
business theory suggesting that higher, national
institutional risk positively affects the likelihood of
EJVs as the MNE’s preferred entry mode outside
the EMU. However, in the case of far-reaching
regional integration, in this case the EMU, we
empirically show that higher institutional risk
actually tends to reverse the conventional effect: it
increases rather than decreases MNE preferences
for WOSs in host countries inside the EMU, since
insider MNEs ‘prefer the control to “do it their
way”’ (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986, p. 18).
Multinational enterprises appear to have a
high level of conﬁdence in their ability to manage
national institutional risk themselves, possibly be-
cause of the presence of overarching, high-quality
regional institutions, with which they are familiar,
but also because requisite complementary assets
can now more easily be accessed in efficient
external markets, thus vitiating the need for EJV
partners. National institutional risk – rather than
remaining an exogenous parameter, to be man-
aged through the complementary resources from a
local EJV partner – becomes a variable on which
the MNE may want to exercise more control
through establishing WOSs, especially where such
national risk is supposedly higher.
This approach becomes similar to the man-
agement of micro-level contracting risk, whereby
the MNE decides to forego complementary re-
sources provided by potential EJV partners in or-
der to keep full control over the use of its own re-
sources reservoir, while accessing complementary
resources in efficient external markets. With har-
monized economic, ﬁscal and monetary policies in
the home and the host country, insider ﬁrms focus
on the full exploitation of their distinctive advan-
tages without having to worry about possible dys-
functional spillover effects from the macro level to
the micro level of contracting when EJVs are used.
The UK referendum that ended in favour of
Brexit has given a high visibility to the ongoing
public debate about the desirability of differential
integration levels, especially through the presence
of euro-insiders and euro-outsiders, i.e. a ‘two-
speed’ Europe. For example, euro-outsiders must
address the trade-off between increased formal in-
terdependence with the EU vs. more state-based
sovereignty, with Brexit-like scenario’s represent-
ing one extreme option (Adler-Nissen, 2016). As
our results show, these macro-level political uncer-
tainties do also affect business and can lead to dif-
ferential considerations by ﬁrms on the impact of
institutional risk, irrespective of whether the host
country is an EMU insider or other EU country.
In likely scenarios whereby populist movements in
both EMU insider countries and other EU coun-
tries will increase national institutional risk for for-
eign MNEs (e.g. in countries such as Austria and
Poland), but will remain short of forcing an exit
scenario, our prediction is that regional insider
MNEs will increasingly try to avoid EJVs and will
exhibit a stronger preference for WOSs, so as to
prevent macro-level frailties from spilling over to
the micro level. The likelihood of such negative
spillovers from the macro level to the micro level
is actually rather high. Meyer (2017) compellingly
argued that the beneﬁts of higher globalization
(which would actually include deeper regional in-
tegration as a stepping stone) outweigh any nega-
tive side effects. He explained that recent populist
movements against globalization are not rooted
in globalization concerns per se, but have arisen
from failings of domestic policies (Kobrin, 2017,
p. 169). This observation is important, because it
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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suggests a sociological rationale for the predicted,
added micro-level challenges when engaging with
local EJV partners in high-institutional-risk coun-
tries. If foreign MNEs are viewed negatively as
‘agents of globalization’, the self-imposed barriers
against contract breaches by local EJV partners
(often called forbearance in the EJV context) are
likely to weaken, thus making WOSs more attrac-
tive for the foreign MNEs.
Our overall results reveal that, in the period be-
tween 1999 and 2014, cultural distance did not
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect onMNE inter-
nationalization (see also Beugelsdijk et al., 2018).
When assessing the interaction effect of regional
integration, this interaction term was not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant either, meaning thatMNEs do not
perceive cultural distance as a critical variable to
entry-mode strategy (Shore, 2000). The reason, in
our view, is that cultural distance does not nec-
essarily translate into objectively higher hazards
for the MNE in terms of behavioural dysfunction
in micro-level contracting: higher cultural distance
at the macro level does not need to spill over to
more expected dishonesty or broader unreliability
in micro-level contracting. This observation is in
line with the view that a clear distinction must be
made between, on the one hand, cultural values
and related distances at the societal level and, on
the other hand, the personal values of individuals.
Here, the intra-country variation in values can be
much larger than cross-country variation (see e.g.
Fischer and Schwartz, 2011; Verbeke, Yuan and
Kano, 2018). This statement holds true especially
for host countries that share extensive common
ground in cultural terms with a ﬁrm’s home coun-
try. In our paper, we explain what far-reaching,
regional integration means, i.e. to a large extent
national institutions being replaced by business-
friendly, high-quality, non-discriminatory, reliable
institutions. This is of course the essence of the Sin-
gle Market, the common EMU monetary policy
and the single currency.
Cultural distance may still be important when
studying a variety of other international business
phenomena (e.g. the effectiveness of cross-cultural
teams; the adoption of established managerial
practices by host-country operations; the magni-
tude of reverse knowledge transfers), or differences
within countries (see Taras, Steel and Kirkman
(2016) for a recent contribution related to this last
point). But our study contributes to the growing
body of literature suggesting that broad cultural
distance indices may not be particularly useful
in studies of MNE entry-mode choices. Beugels-
dijk, Ambos and Nell (2018) in their method-
ological overview of the most important cultural
distance indices used in international business re-
search, make the important point that these cul-
tural indices are useful to measure distance in gen-
eral, but typically do not perform well in terms
of their explanatory power when speciﬁc, theory-
based research questions need to be answered, in
this instance related to actual business risks asso-
ciated with human frailty.
Managerial relevance
Our study has two key managerial implications.
First, in a situation of far-reaching regional in-
tegration, our research provides support for the
increasing relevance of the region as a determin-
ing context of entry-mode strategies for ‘insider’
MNEs. A sole focus on widely accepted, national-
level explanatory variables appears insufficient to
understand the impact of locational context. Fur-
ther research on the subject matter is needed, es-
pecially in terms of studying MNEs from several
other EMU countries, but the insight gained from
our work is that MNE managers are unlikely to
see higher national institutional risk as a trigger
for moving from WOSs to EJVs in the home re-
gion, driven by the notion that a local EJV part-
ner would provide the resources required to ad-
dress such risk effectively. On the contrary, higher
national institutional risk within a strongly inte-
grated region becomes a parameter that the ﬁrm
may want to manage itself at the micro level via
setting up WOSs, just as it manages conventional
micro-economic contracting risks in the realm of
knowledge dissipation. Country-level risks that
were conventionally viewed as requiring comple-
mentary resources from a local partner are now
considered risks that can best be managed through
a stronger emphasis on internalization. In the pres-
ence of common regional institutions favourable
to business, managing national institutional risk
through internalization becomes the preferred op-
tion. Internalization of host-country operations
can be combined with accessing requisite comple-
mentary resources in more efficient external mar-
kets. This external resource acquisition process
should not be made more complex by adding a
partner who could take advantage of frail national
institutions.
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Second, given the observed reversal of insti-
tutional risk effects inside the home region, it
would appear likely that managers will move away
from focusing mainly on low-institutional-risk
countries as investment targets, and will instead
pay more attention to each country within the
region as a potential target for future operations
as a function of its economic potential, with less
overall attention devoted to the challenges of
managing frailties. Regional integration de facto
makes the national borders of host countries
permeable and alters the MNE’s decision-making
frame when selecting entry modes.
Limitations and future research directions
Our analysis has two main limitations. First, our
sample included onlyMNEswith a corporate head
office in Belgium and listed on the Belgian stock
exchange, so that the results may not be fully ap-
plicable to privately held ﬁrms or ﬁrms from other
EMU/EU home countries. In 1957, Belgium was
one of the six nations signing the Treaty of Rome,
and it is located in the region’s geographic centre.
Hence, Belgian ﬁrms may have a ‘time advantage’
over companies located in countries that are more
recent signatories of European regional integra-
tion treaties, even if these are now also EMU par-
ticipants.Whether our results will be conﬁrmed for
ﬁrms originating from more recent, and more geo-
graphically peripheral, treaty signatories is uncer-
tain at this point. Future studies should therefore
include ﬁrms from other MNE home countries in-
side the EMU and the EU. Here, it may be impor-
tant to distinguish between early and more recent
treaty signatories and to take into account their lo-
cation, i.e. central vs. peripheral countries within
the EMU, and differences at the subnational level
(Castellani, Meliciani and Mirra, 2016). More-
over, follow-up research could examine the im-
pact of ‘weaker regional integration’ agreements
such as ASEAN and NAFTA or BIT (e.g. Oh and
Fratianni, 2017), to assess whether the EMU re-
sults of our study continue to hold.
Second, the present study’s data analysis has
focused on initial entry-mode choices for a 15-
year period (1999–2014), and not on the evolu-
tion of the operating mode after the initial entry.
We acknowledge that there could be differences in
the likelihood of termination between WOSs and
EJVs, and according to the host country consid-
ered (Makino and Neupert, 2000). For example,
the conﬂict potential between partners may drive
MNEs to transform EJVs into WOSs over time
(Hennart, 1991). The question could also be raised
whether some MNEs might actually have exited a
host country after an initial entry, thereby building
on an existing knowledge pool inside the ﬁrm for
any subsequent entry in the same country within
our timeframe. However, this is not a concern in
our study: Our archival analysis of entries for each
individual ﬁrm in our database did not lead us to
identify any such cases.
Future research could beneﬁt from the use of
data on entry-mode structures for multiple home
countries simultaneously, and include alternative
constructs/approaches to address the effects of for-
mal and informal institutions, e.g. by adding the
interrelationships between institutions (Holmes
et al., 2013), or the direction of distance (Hernan-
dez and Nieto, 2015). In addition, survey-based
data could be considered that would include ﬁ-
nancial, strategic or managerial risk preferences.
This type of study could extend our insight into re-
gional integration impacts by adding more micro-
level parameters.
Conclusion
In this study, we have considered the impact of
home–regional integration on two conventionally
assumed drivers of MNE entry-mode choices,
namely institutional risk and cultural distance be-
tween countries. More speciﬁcally, we have inves-
tigated the EMU’s impact on MNE entry-mode
choices. Building on a sample of 1368 foreign mar-
ket entries of Belgian MNEs, our study has ex-
tended prior research on entry-mode choices by
differentiating between investments inside and out-
side the EMU. Cultural distance does not appear
to be relevant for strategic decision-making, in
terms of entry-mode choice, either as a main ef-
fect or when linked with regional integration as
an interaction variable. This is a result that mer-
its reporting, because a large prior literature did
predict a positive main effect on MNE prefer-
ences for EJVs. The main reason is probably that
the mechanisms through which cultural distance
in general could supposedly inﬂuence entry-mode
choices can be varied. In our case, the contextu-
alization is also critical: It is one where a change
in formal institutional arrangements at the macro
level supposedly inﬂuences micro-level hazards.
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We did formulate a hypothesis whereby higher
cultural distance would, in parallel, exacerbate
frailties at the micro level when using EJVs. But
higher cultural differences at themacro level do not
necessarily translate at all into new micro-level
frailties. Here, it is probably fair to state that most
extant studies measuring the impact of cultural
distance were under-contextualized.
Importantly, our results demonstrate that, in-
side the home region, the conventional positive im-
pact of national institutional risk on preferences
for EJVs is reversed because of regional integra-
tion: In the presence of a reliable, regional reg-
ulatory regime, higher national institutional risk
is viewed as a frailty that could cascade down to
micro-level relationships with EJV partners, and
that canmore easily bemanagedwithin the context
of a WOS. At the same time, the conventional in-
ternational business theory prediction of a positive
impact of institutional risk on the preference for
EJVs outside the integrated home region remains
valid.
As a ﬁnal point, the present populist move-
ments observed throughout the world in favour
of stronger national sovereignty imply higher in-
stitutional risk associated with foreign entries in
the countries where these movements can actually
inﬂuence policy. Within an integrated region such
as the EMU, with well-functioning regional insti-
tutions, this might imply an even stronger prefer-
ence for WOSs (e.g. investments from EMU ﬁrms
into Greece), because of the regional institutional
reliability, combined with the fear that frailties at
the national level may spill over to micro-level
contracting with EJV partners. For investments
outside the region in a country with new protec-
tionist tendencies (such as investments by EMU
ﬁrms in the USA), we predict a stronger preference
for EJVs to navigate more effectively the new in-
stitutional uncertainties. Here, ‘regional outsider’
MNEs cannot rely on the same regional layer of
high-quality institutions beneﬁting insider MNEs.
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